diff options
| author | Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> | 2026-07-03 09:21:32 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> | 2026-07-03 09:21:32 +0000 |
| commit | 767ddade57f189827fa956ff8081ca47404a4798 (patch) | |
| tree | e2b44d0e943e1cc5cf2b11e0b826902a24b63802 /internal/executor/nativerunner.go | |
| parent | 81ae7d598e7ec6afe8afb5bbdbfe807042298559 (diff) | |
feat(sandbox): add DockerSandbox + pre-tool-use guardrail hooks (Phase 3)
Gives native-API-driven agents (currently just the Phase 2 Anthropic
adapter) real container isolation, decoupled from model invocation --
the model call happens in the Go process via provider.Provider, only tool
execution happens in the container, unlike the CLI-subprocess ContainerRunner
(left completely untouched) where the claude/gemini CLI runs inside the
container.
- internal/sandbox/dockersandbox.go: Sandbox via a long-lived
`docker run -d ... sleep infinity` container (started once per execution,
not per tool call), host-side git clone + bind-mount matching
ContainerRunner's existing pattern, docker exec for read/write/bash/glob.
Reuses images/agent-base (claudomator-agent:latest) rather than
standing up a second image. WorkDir()/resume persists the host bind-mount
directory (matching HostSandbox's contract); a resumed sandbox lazily
starts a fresh container against that directory rather than trying to
reattach to a possibly-gone one.
- internal/sandbox/guard.go, hooks.go: Hook interface (CheckBash/CheckWrite),
Guarded wrapper, DenylistBashHook (rm -rf /, force-push, curl|sh, sudo,
chmod 777, dd if=) and ProtectedPathHook (.git/**, .env*, credentials/,
.github/workflows/**). A rejection returns *RejectionError, which
agentloop/tools.go now recognizes and feeds back to the model as a normal
(non-fatal) tool-error result instead of aborting the run.
- NativeRunner wraps whichever Sandbox it builds (Host or Docker) in
Guarded{Hooks: DefaultHooks()} uniformly. The "anthropic" runner now uses
DockerSandbox; "local" stays on HostSandbox by design (local models are
the harness's more-trusted, lower-stakes-to-run tier).
Docker is not installed in this dev environment (no docker/podman/containerd
on PATH), so DockerSandbox's real container-lifecycle behavior is verified
via mocked-command unit tests only -- go test -race ./... passes throughout,
with the two real-daemon integration tests gated behind a dockerAvailable(t)
check and skipping here. Live verification against an actual Docker host is
a follow-up before relying on the "anthropic" agent type in production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V1moSNCJRcP6kykA4tyUSs
Diffstat (limited to 'internal/executor/nativerunner.go')
| -rw-r--r-- | internal/executor/nativerunner.go | 33 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/internal/executor/nativerunner.go b/internal/executor/nativerunner.go index 6fe4196..fa2b89a 100644 --- a/internal/executor/nativerunner.go +++ b/internal/executor/nativerunner.go @@ -45,6 +45,21 @@ type NativeRunner struct { // MaxTurns bounds the tool-use loop; defaults to agentloop.DefaultMaxTurns // (12, matching the former executor.maxLocalToolTurns) when zero. MaxTurns int + + // SandboxKind selects the Sandbox implementation used for this runner's + // tool calls: "" or "host" uses sandbox.HostSandbox (host-side git clone + // with path-prefix confinement only); "docker" uses sandbox.DockerSandbox + // for real container isolation. Config-driven per provider — see + // internal/cli/serve.go/run.go, which set this to "docker" for the + // "anthropic" runner and leave it "host" (the zero value) for "local": + // local models are presumed more trusted/lower-stakes, so they keep the + // weaker but zero-overhead host sandbox per the harness design. + SandboxKind string + + // SandboxImage is the docker image used when SandboxKind == "docker". + // Empty uses DockerSandbox's own default (images/agent-base, i.e. + // "claudomator-agent:latest"). + SandboxImage string } var _ Runner = (*NativeRunner)(nil) @@ -59,6 +74,17 @@ func (r *NativeRunner) ExecLogDir(execID string) string { return filepath.Join(r.LogDir, execID) } +// newBaseSandbox constructs the unguarded Sandbox implementation selected by +// r.SandboxKind, rooted at dir ("" for a fresh not-yet-cloned sandbox, an +// existing directory to resume one). Callers wrap the result in +// sandbox.Guarded before use. +func (r *NativeRunner) newBaseSandbox(dir string) sandbox.Sandbox { + if r.SandboxKind == "docker" { + return sandbox.NewDockerSandbox(r.SandboxImage, dir) + } + return sandbox.NewHostSandbox(dir) +} + // Run drives a chat completion against r.Provider with the agent back-channel // tools (ask_user/report_summary/spawn_subtask/record_progress) and sandbox // tools (read_file/write_file/run_bash/glob) declared, via agentloop.Loop. If @@ -90,11 +116,14 @@ func (r *NativeRunner) Run(ctx context.Context, t *task.Task, e *storage.Executi defer stdout.Close() // --- Sandbox setup (git clone into a temp dir, or reuse on resume) --- - sb := sandbox.NewHostSandbox("") + // Guardrails (DenylistBashHook/ProtectedPathHook) are applied uniformly + // by the Sandbox wrapper regardless of provider or sandbox kind — there + // is no per-role configurability yet. + sb := &sandbox.Guarded{Sandbox: r.newBaseSandbox(""), Hooks: sandbox.DefaultHooks()} if t.Agent.ProjectDir != "" { if e.SandboxDir != "" { // Reuse existing sandbox on resume (BLOCKED → QUEUED path). - sb = sandbox.NewHostSandbox(e.SandboxDir) + sb = &sandbox.Guarded{Sandbox: r.newBaseSandbox(e.SandboxDir), Hooks: sandbox.DefaultHooks()} } else { if cloneErr := sb.GitClone(ctx, t.Agent.ProjectDir, ""); cloneErr != nil { return fmt.Errorf("native runner: %w", cloneErr) |
