merge: integrate oss branch — budget gating, MCP back-channel, events, loopback-only bind

Key features from OSS branch:
- Budget gating: rolling per-provider spend caps with BUDGET_EXCEEDED task state
- Agent MCP back-channel: runners mint tokens; /mcp endpoint resolves them
- Chatbot MCP server at /chatbot/mcp (requires api_token in config)
- Event timeline: unified event stream replacing ad-hoc question/summary flows
- Loopback-only default bind (127.0.0.1:8484); external_bind_allowed=true to expose
- repository_url required on task creation (enforces traceability)
- Auto-checker: spawns verification task after each execution

Conflict resolutions:
- serve.go: keep cfg.Runners.XEnabled() conditional registration from main + agentRegistry from oss
- config.go: keep RunnersConfig from main + BudgetConfig/ExternalBindAllowed from oss
- server.go: handleStaticFiles (base-path rewrite) kept; deduplicated duplicate from both sides
- executor/claude.go: accepted oss deletion (ClaudeRunner replaced by ContainerRunner)
- container_test.go: added noopChannel + AgentChannel parameter to Run call

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/internal/config/bind.go b/internal/config/bind.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f117385
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/config/bind.go
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+package config
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+)
+
+// ValidateBindAddr enforces loopback-by-default binding. It returns an error
+// when addr resolves to a non-loopback interface and externalAllowed is false,
+// so the server fails loud rather than silently exposing itself. Loopback
+// addresses (127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost) always pass.
+func ValidateBindAddr(addr string, externalAllowed bool) error {
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		// No port (or malformed): treat the whole string as the host.
+		host = addr
+	}
+	if isLoopbackHost(host) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if externalAllowed {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf(
+		"refusing to bind non-loopback address %q: set external_bind_allowed = true to override, "+
+			"but prefer fronting external access with a reverse proxy (Tailscale / Cloudflare Access / Caddy)",
+		addr,
+	)
+}
+
+// isLoopbackHost reports whether host is a loopback target. An empty host
+// (e.g. ":8484") or 0.0.0.0/:: binds all interfaces and is NOT loopback.
+func isLoopbackHost(host string) bool {
+	switch host {
+	case "localhost":
+		return true
+	case "":
+		return false
+	}
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
+		return ip.IsLoopback()
+	}
+	return false
+}